Abstract-Despite advancements in the analysis of networks with respect to geographic vulnerabilities, very few approaches exist that can be applied to large networks with varied applications and network measures. Natural and man-made disasters as well as major political events (like riots) have kept the challenges of geographic failures in networks in the forefront. With the increasing interest in multilayer and virtual networks, methods to analyze these networks for geographic vulnerabilities are important.
I. INTRODUCTION
As multilayer and virtual networks become increasingly used for emergency and mission-critical applications, the need to protect those networks from massive geographic events becomes imperative. When emergency networks are not functional due to geographic events, the very network infrastructure needed for disaster response becomes affected. The complexity of virtual and multilayer mapping onto physical networks increases the challenges of identifying vulnerabilities in networks. This is certainly the case with failures that are correlated geographically spanning multiple layers as shown in Fig. 1 .
The state space reduction algorithm presented in [11] effectively identifies geographic areas that can cause significant damage to the ability for the network to perform its function. In this work, we extend the state space reduction algorithm presented in [11] in two ways. First, a method to map the network failure state on multiple layers is presented allowing upper layer demands to be mapped on upper and lower network layers with the current operational state due to the failure state. Second, the challenge of mapping geographic vulnerabilities onto large networks with a high number of nodes is addressed with a couple of heuristics that further significantly reduce the number of states required for network testing. This is more important with multilayer networks because provisioning multilayer or virtual demands tends to be more complex than single layer demands.
II. RELATED WORK
The work presented here is at the intersection of enumerations techniques, geographic vulnerabilities in networks, and impacts on multilayer and virtual networks. The related works span these areas also.
Colbourn and Ball pioneered much of the work in network reliability using network state enumeration and the costs of those methods in [7] and [3] . Li and Sylvester [15] were one of the first to propose using most probable state algorithms to calculate bounds for network reliability. Jarvis and Shier [13] , as well as Dotson and Gobien [8] also presented most probable state methods. Gomes et al. [12] extended the idea to multimode network models. Dotson and Gobien [8] developed a new method to calculate 2-terminal reliability based on De Morgan's law. Conveniently, the network state space is reduced when the 2-terminal test fails. The methods in [11] and [10] use the same method of state space reduction. This is the same algorithm we are using to analyze multilayer networks.
Graph theoretic metrics are another way to compute geographic resiliency. These metrics include node degree, algebraic connectivity, betweeness, and more recently weighted spectral distribution. Work that compares these metrics includes Bigdeli et al. [5] and Long et al. [16] . A complete description of the more recent weighted spectral distribution can be found in [9] . One of the challenges of most of these metrics is that generally they evaluate a topology for a specific metric not an entire network with traffic demands of varying design and importance. The ability to evaluate weighted graphs improves the situation. By itself, it is not enough information to find vulnerable regions in networks without a brute force type of analysis. Optimization algorithms have been used in conjunction with these metrics to isolate and/or improve vulnerable nodes, links, or cuts. This was the method used by [16] , and Neumayer et al. in [18] . Algebraic connectivity was used with state space methods to assess geographic vulnerability in [10] . The major challenge with these methods is the lack of flexibility when choosing a network measure. This is especially true with multilayer networks. In our work, we built an evaluation system that works with any network measure that may be used.
In the past few years, there has been a significant amount of activity in the area of geographically correlated failures. Banerjee, Shirazipourazad, and Sen created an algorithm in [4] that uses intersections of regions around nodes and links to create a complete set of regions that can be used to analyze region based failures in networks. They fail each region and compute the largest remaining connected component. The original design was for use in sensor networks. The interesting contribution here is that they were able to produce a complete set of principle regions in polynomial time. Our work differs in that they computed the worst regions based on a connectivity related damage metric. We find failure modes that are geographically correlated and determine the physical area of the network that can cause these failure modes. We can also use multiple types of network measures. Li, Wang, and Jiang [14] expand on the work in [4] in two areas. First, they considered multiple regions as opposed to one region. Second, they augmented the network by adding link capacity to ensure all traffic could withstand multiple region failures. Like our work, they looked at multiple failures caused by events occurring at the intersection of regions surrounding nodes. They computed a stochastic probability of nodes failing based on the distance from the event and they used a simulation to generate results. We do not use simulation, but rather find correlated failure modes and then determine the intersecting regions.
Rahnamay-Naeini et al. [21] built a model that uses geographically correlated stochastic models to generate link failures. The model is a Strauss point process. They then computed the average two-terminal connectivity and all-terminal connectivity using a Monte Carlo simulation. Our work is not stochastic in nature; rather, it produces all of the failure modes. We also focus on nodal failures (although our work could be extended to link failure as well). Naumayer and Modiano [17] presented work that calculated probabilities of geographically correlated failures in the presence of randomly placed line segments that can intersect network links. The fact that they were able to produce graphically correlated probabilities of link failure and translate them into an allterminal probability and two-terminal probability is significant. The results show the differences between random failure and correlated geographic failure. This work was not necessarily interested in finding network vulnerabilities but overall reliability considering correlated link failures.
In [1] , [2] , Agarwal et al. created hippodromes around network components based on at attack radius. From this, they were able to estimate the probability of failure of these components based on a geographically correlated event. This allowed them to estimate the average two-terminal reliability and capacity degradations both in terms of the number of failed components and the amount of capacity that was affected. This work does provide an indication of the most vulnerable locations in networks for an attack.
In [6] , Ç etinkaya et al. developed a complete network resilience framework that includes an analytical and simulation framework. The analytical framework is capable of mapping a network by layer, service provided, topology, operational state, and resilience quantification. It essentially provides a framework to model and challenge a network in a wide variety of ways. The simulation framework provides an NS-3 simulation framework to define a network and a challenge to this network. That network (and challenge) is then simulated and results produced. Many of the mapping principles are similar to the work by Ç etinkaya. The enumeration algorithm is unique.
Oikonomou, Sinha, and Doverspike presented a multilayer model that incorporates state space enumeration in [19] . The state generation algorithm is similar to that of Jarvis and Shier in that it relies on most probably states first to minimize the number of states analyzed. However, they traversed the network layers with a set of network operational state parameters that effectively translated the network state to those layers.
Our goal is to utilize and enhance the algorithms in [11] including incorporating some of the multilayer characteristics of the models in [6] and [19] to provide a model that will detect geographic vulnerabilities in multilayer networks.
III. BACKGROUND ON SELF-PRUNING NETWORK STATE GENERATION
The self-pruning network state generation (SP-NSG) algorithm, originally presented in [11] , uses an algorithm developed by Dotson [8] for the purpose of calculating 2-terminal reliability to generate states as the algorithm progresses. It creates a lexicographic ordering of states based on De Morgan's (1) States are generated based on (1) as shown in Fig. 2 where '0' denotes a working network component and '1' denotes a failed network component. To create the algorithm, the following terms are defined: Definition 1. Geographic Vulnerability: A Geographic Vulnerability is the geographic area of a network that if attacked can cause significant impact to the function of the entire network.
Definition 2. Geospatial Event: A Geospatial Event is an event that can cause a geographic vulnerability.
Definition 3. Threat Radius: The Threat Radius is the physical radius of a geospatial event that is used to define the geographic vulnerability.
The following assumptions are used to develop SP-NSG. Assumption 1. If a network state S i with node(s) k 1 . . . k m failed causes the network to be non-functional, X(S i ) < f ailed threshold(X min ), then any S j that contains node(s) k 1 . . . k m as failed will cause X(S j ) ≤ X(S i ). Therefore, S j does not need to be examined. Assumption 2. If a network state S i with node(s) k 1 . . . k m failed is not a feasible failure mode, then any S j that contains node(s) k 1 . . . k m as failed will also not be feasible. Therefore, S j does not need to be examined.
An example of Assumption 1 is a failure state that has failed nodes separated by a large distance if geographically correlated failures are being analyzed. As presented earlier, Dotson used De Morgan's Law (1) to reduce the search space necessary to calculate reliability [8] . We use a similar approach to create a state generation algorithm.
As we can see from Fig. 2 , State 1 generates States 6 to 9 by incrementally failing each node that is after the last failed node in State 1. This follows De Morgan's Law (1) by dividing the state space into two sections. The first section is represented by the previously successful test (in this case state 1) represented by P and the section that is untested (in this case States 6-9) represented by P . This is the implementation of the SP-NSG as originally presented in [11] .
We first test the state Fig. 2 . The SP-NSG operates as shown in Fig. 3 . The network model being used includes a lower layer Fig. 4 . The upper layer network is modeled as an undirected graph denoted as G U (V U , E U ). Customer demands are assumed to be given to the upper layer network. The demand would be of the form D i = s, t, dem , which indicates the ith demand from the upper layer source (s), upper layer destination (t), and the amount of demand (dem)
B. Multilayer SP-NSG
Recall that a failure state is denoted as S i . In Fig. 3 , we see that the step Reconfigure Network from State S i assumes the links and nodes are based on the network state S i . The step Test New Network assumes a single layer network test. This network test may be as simple as a portion of the total services that were able to be provisioned.
To reconfigure the multilayer network, new G U and G L must be generated. In order to generate new links (E L , E U ), surviving nodes (V L , V U ) must be generated. If we assume that the upper layer nodes will always share a location with a lower layer node, then the state space for both layers can always be defined with the lower layer state space (S i = S L,i ). Then a simple transformation is required to convert to the upper layer state space. This is completed with the use of an n × m transformation matrix L LU where n is the number of lower layer nodes and m is the number of upper layer nodes. If a mapping exists between the lower and upper layer, L LU (l, u) = 1, where l is the lower layer node number and u is the upper layer node number. All other matrix locations are 0. Converting the network state i from a lower layer to an upper one is a simple transformation as shown below:
To illustrate the point, the network shown in Fig. 4 would have a transformation matrix as shown below:
The algorithm to Reconfigure Network from State S i is shown in Algorithm 1. The algorithm to Test New Network is shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 1 Reconfigure Network from State
S i for all n in V L nodes do if S i,n = 0 then include n in V L,i end if end for for all k in E L links do if V L,i contains end nodes for k then include k in E L,i end if end for S U,i ← S L,i L LU for all n in V U nodes do if S U in = 0 then include n in V U,i end if end for for all k in E U links do if V U,i contains end nodes for k & path k exists in G L,i then include k in E U,i end if end for
Algorithm 2 Greedy Algorithm to Test New Network for
for all links j on P Lk do cost ← cost + cap j end for end for Network Measure X i ← succ/(succ + f ail)
C. Improvements to SP-NSG for Geographic Vulnerabilities in Large Networks
One of the issues with multilayer networks is that the network test typically has high computational costs. The original implementation of SP-NSG has a cost that is associated with the maximum number of states 2
Nr in a particular threat radius r. As we know from [11] , the number of states analyzed is still typically a fraction of the maximum number of states. However, as the cost of the network test rises, every effort needs to be made to control state space expansion in the particular threat radius areas. Assumption 3. If two nodes are located in close proximity to each other and if one node fails due to a geographic event, then the other node will also fail.
Assumption 3 raises some interesting questions. First, should probabilistic failures be considered? This is a question that affects the entire SP-NSG algorithm. Following the mission-critical thread, when looking for geographic vulnerabilities in networks, we are less interested in what is the likely outcome as we are with what is the potential outcome if mitigating steps are not taken. To that end, Assumption 3 seems to apply. We are looking for the worst case, not the average case.
With Assumption 3, we can propose that a node could represent multiple nodes that are located in close proximity to each other. The set of nodes used in the state generation algorithm can be reduced and mapping can be established to both the upper and lower set of nodes/links. It is certainly acknowledged that this becomes an approximation when the node location that is considered in the state generation is not exactly the node location in the network. But, if the distance between the new node location and the mapped nodes is relatively small, the outcome should be the same.
The advantage of this approach is that the network nodes (in either layer) that are no longer included in the state generation algorithm are still used via mapping. This preserves the network connectivity and structure at those layers.
To select new node locations, a K-means clustering algorithm is employed in areas of the network that are dense. Algorithm 3 is used to create a new set of nodes V A .
Once V A is known, mapping can be generated in a manner similar to the previous section that allows the network states generated from V A to be mapped onto V L and V U . (4) shows the necessary equations. S U,i is still created from (2).
One final optimization that was used was to store the shortest path results during the initial (all working) network test. If a new network state does not affect any of the nodes in the original shortest path, the original results would still hold and a new shortest path calculation does not need to be run. In a large network, this presents substantial improvements. Now, we briefly discuss the complexity of our approach. Without clustering, the complexity of our approach is F (N ) * N * 2 n where n is the maximum number of nodes in a threat radius, N is the total number of nodes, and F (N ) is the complexity of computing the network measure. When clustering is incorporated, the complexity is reduced to F (N ) * N * 2 k , where k is the new maximum number of nodes in a threat radius after clustering. Clearly, if k can be limited to a relatively small number (k n), then the complexity is significantly reduced. Now consider the complexity of F (N ). For the multilayer case, a breadth-first shortest path calculation (BFS) is used for Algorithm 3 Large Network Node Reduction Algorithm using K-Means Clustering 
every link in the upper layer network across the lower layer network along with a breadth-first shortest path calculation for every user demand across the upper layer network. Therefore,
V. RESULTS
To test the the multilayer and node reduction algorithms, we examined two test networks for geographic vulnerabilities. The first network was constructed from a 16-node Gabriel topology. The lower layer network, referred to as the substrate network consisted of all 16 nodes. Several 6 node upper layer networks are constructed on the lower layer 16-node network for testing. The second network that was tested contained 383 nodes. The lower layer network is constructed from the AT&T Layer 1 topology generated by Sterbenz et al. [22] . The upper layer network was constructed on the lower layer network and was modeled from the Janus-US network that is available at the Survivable Network Design Library (SNDlib 1.0) [20] . A variation of the Janus-US network with several links removed was used as a separate upper layer network case. We note the lower layer network at ATTL1 and the upper layer networks as sparse and dense, respectively.
Two different network fail conditions were used: 1) Percentage of demands dropped 2) Percentage of cost over base (no fail) costs These were applied either with 1) alone or with 1) followed by 2) if 1) passes. The costs were calculated as mentioned in Algorithm 2. For example, if a particular network failure mode maintained 95% of the demands but at an increased cost of 125% over base costs, then this is considered as a failed state.
The costs are related to the distance that must be traveled to maintain a demand across the lower layer network. If a geographically correlated failure causes a considerable amount of rerouting across the lower layer network, the costs reflect this. The concept is that we should be able to minimize the amount of bandwidth that needs to be provisioned across the lower layer network and still mitigate geographically correlated failures. The failure probability is based on a random attack in the network physical area. The vulnerable area/network area is then defined as the failure probability.
A. Gabriel 16-Node Lower Layer Network
The configuration of the demands on the upper layer network is that there is a demand for each upper layer node pair. The demands are provisioned on the upper layer network, which is in turn provisioned as links on the lower layer network. This is described in detail in Algorithm 2. Table I shows the configuration and results gathered testing the gabriel network. We tested three upper layer network configurations; they are the ring, mesh, and star network configurations. Each was then tested with two network measures.
We observed that the mesh upper layer network performed better than with a ring upper layer network. The star upper layer network performed the worst with the vulnerability that is located at the center of the star. The vulnerabilities when testing without the cost limitation were generally related to the demand end points. The exception was the star configuration. The failure locations shown for all three configurations are shown in Fig. 5a -Fig. 5b . The one region of note on all three configurations is the area between nodes 0 and 11. This is because if any two upper layer nodes are removed, the number of demands that maintained connections fell below 50%. Consider now if the cost limitation is imposed. As we can see in Fig. 5c -Fig. 5e , the upper layer ring network has vulnerabilities between nodes 12 and 3 associated with rerouting the bottom portion of the ring in the event of a failure of both nodes 12 and 3. In addition, if node 9 fails, rerouting on the left side of the ring causes that area to be identified as a vulnerable. When a mesh upper layer network is used, the vulnerability on the left side of the network disappears, but node 12 becomes more vulnerable. It should be noted that the base costs are less expensive with the star and the mesh networks than the ring network.
B. ATTL1 383 Node Lower Network
The lower network and one of the upper layer networks is shown in Fig. 6a . In a manner similar to the Gabriel network, the configuration of the demands on the upper layer network is that there is a demand for each upper layer node pair. The demands are provisioned on the upper layer network, which is in turn provisioned as links on the lower layer network. This is described in detail in Algorithm 2. Table II shows the configuration and results gathered testing the ATTL1 network. As discussed previously, there are two upper layer network configurations, dense and sparse. Each was then tested with two network measures.
We observed that when the connectivity of demands was concerned, the two upper layer configurations performed similarly as is shown in Fig. 6b . This is because the lower layer network is spread out geographically and did not contain geographic vulnerabilities strictly as far as connectivity is concerned. However, looking at Fig. 6c and Fig. 6d , when cost limitations were imposed there were differences. The dense upper layer network had less vulnerabilities related to the cost of implementing the demands. This is intuitive as there are better routing options in the more dense upper layer network when parts of the network are disabled. 
C. ATTL1 383 Node Clustering Results
The node clusters that were replaced with a single node during the state analysis are shown in Fig. 6e . These were chosen using Algorithm 3 (K-means clustering). With a threat radius of 1.5, several of the regions in the network were too dense to analyze without other limitations (like a bound on the number of simultaneously failed nodes). In a 1.5 radius region, 9 nodes were chosen as the number to cluster. If a region had more than 9 nodes the clustering algorithm was run, and the nodes in that region were reduced to 9. Fig. 6e(e) and Fig. 6e(f) show the effects of the clustering algorithm with a threat radius of 1.5. Taking a closer look at the most dense part of the network, Fig. 6f , it is apparent that replacements were made consistently with node cluster locations.
Assessing the performance of this algorithm is difficult because of the challenge running the analysis without clustering. When the analysis with a threat radius of 0.5 was run without clustering, 2779 network tests were executed. When the number of nodes in a threat radius was limited to 9 using clustering, 1124 network tests were executed. When the number of nodes in a threat radius was further limited to 4 using clustering, 701 network tests were run. Clearly, the improvements are more significant if a large number of nodes in an area can be reduced to a small number. However, it is likely to come at the expense of accuracy. When these tests were run with a threat radius of 0.5, the results were the same between clustering and non-clustering approaches. The issue of determining the accuracy as the threat radius grows, remains an open problem that requires further investigation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we presented and demonstrated a method to extend traditional state space analysis to multilayer networks. In addition, we presented node reduction techniques using K-means clustering as a method to reduce the burden of a state space search in a large network. Results from both methods were found to be promising. These types of methods are generally possible because of the unique relationship that nodes in the same geographic area have with each other, such as when they would fail simultaneously in the face of a large attack.
The benefit of this work is that methods can now be created to analyze large multilayer networks for geographic vulnerabilities with reasonable assumptions. An example of this is a simple lower layer connectivity. The potential is that a variety of network tests could be incorporated and the analysis techniques could be applied to other networking environments including virtual networks, service oriented architecture (SOA), and other multilayer networks. 
